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857 
NEW YORK’S GRANT OF GREATER FIFTH AMENDMENT 
RIGHTS TO SEXUAL PREDATORS IN SOMTA 
PROCEEDINGS 
 
SUPREME COURT OF NEW YORK 
NEW YORK COUNTY 
New York v. Suggs1 
(decided April 18, 2011) 
 
John Suggs was a repeat sexual offender who objected to be-
ing called as a witness in an Article 10 proceeding.2  Suggs argued 
that being called to testify against his will violated his privilege 
against self-incrimination made available to him by the Fifth 
Amendment of the United States Constitution,3 as well as article I, 
section 6 of the New York Constitution.4  The State sought to call 
Suggs as a witness in order to prove that Suggs suffered from a Men-
tal Abnormality under Article 10 of New York State‟s Mental Hy-
giene Law, titled the Sexual Management and Treatment Act [herei-
nafter “SOMTA”];5 SOMTA provides for the “indefinite confinement 
or indefinite strict and intensive supervision and treatment” of per-
sons found to suffer from a mental abnormality.6  Despite the fact that 
 
1 920 N.Y.S.2d 644 (Sup. Ct. 2011). 
2 Id. at 645. 
3 The Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution reads, in pertinent part: “No per-
son shall be . . . compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself . . . .”  U.S. 
CONST. amend. V. 
4 Article I, section 6 of the New York Constitution reads, in pertinent part: “No person 
shall be . . . compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself or herself . . . .”  
N.Y. CONST. art I, § 6. 
5 Suggs, 920 N.Y.S.2d at 645. 
6 See MENTAL HYG. § 10.03(i) (2011) (defining a “Mental abnormality” as: “[A] congenit-
al or acquired condition, disease or disorder that affects the emotional, cognitive, or volition-
al capacity of a person in a manner that predisposes him or her to the commission of conduct 
constituting a sex offense and that results in that person having serious difficulty in control-
ling such conduct”). 
1
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neither the federal nor state‟s constitutions invoke the right against 
self-incrimination in SOMTA proceedings, the court concluded that 
“the language of Article 10 itself, . . . indicates that the Legislature 
did not intend to allow the State to call SOMTA respondents as wit-
nesses for the state over a respondent‟s objection.”7  Thus, the court 
denied the motion to compel Suggs to testify absent his consent.8 
On January 28, 2009, the State filed a petition against Res-
pondent Suggs for sex offender civil management under Article 10 of 
the Mental Hygiene Law, resulting from Suggs‟ extensive history of 
sexually committed crimes.9  Dating back to the age of seventeen, 
Suggs, who was fifty-nine years of age at the time of the proceeding, 
had committed six forcible rapes and two attempted rapes.10  A 
SOMTA jury trial subsequently commenced to have Suggs indefi-
nitely confined as prescribed by the statute.11  During the SOMTA 
proceeding, the State produced testimony from two psychologists, 
Dr. Stuart Kirschner and Dr. Tricia Peterson.12  Both psychologists 
were of the opinion that Suggs suffered from a Mental Abnormality 
under the act.13  A third psychologist, Dr. Joseph Plaud, presented by 
Suggs, testified that Suggs “did not suffer from such a Mental Ab-
 
7 Suggs, 920 N.Y.S.2d at 646. 
8 Id. at 654. 
9 Id. at 645. 
10 New York v. Suggs, No. 30051-09, 2011 WL 2586413, at *5, *21 (N.Y. June 30, 
2011).  In 1968, Suggs pled guilty to Rape in the First Degree for attacks allegedly commit-
ted against several women in the surrounding area of City College, located in Manhattan.  
Suggs, 920 N.Y.S.2d at 645.  Suggs was sentenced to a term of five to fifteen years of incar-
ceration as a result of his guilty plea.  Id.  Ten years later, the federal district court found that 
Suggs was not mentally competent enough to enter a guilty plea.  Id.  This decision was 
granted following Suggs‟ petition for a writ of habeas corpus after lengthy state and federal 
appeals.  Id.  The decision was affirmed by the Second Circuit in Suggs v. LaVallee, 570 
F.2d 1092 (1978).  Id.  Suggs was consequently released from prison.  Suggs, 920 N.Y.S.2d 
at 645.  Shortly thereafter—twenty-eight days later—Suggs was once again charged with 
rape.  Id.  Following his conviction, Suggs was sentenced to seventy-four months to twenty 
years incarceration.  Id.  In 1996, four years after his release, Suggs was convicted of Rape 
in the First Degree by forcible compulsion and was sentenced to twelve and one-half years 
of incarceration.  Id. 
11 Id. 
12 Suggs, 920 N.Y.S.2d at 645. 
13 Id.  Dr. Kirshner summarized his views as follows: “Mr. Suggs is an extremely danger-
ous man.  He is under no uncertain terms a serial rapist. . . . And other than the fact that he‟s 
aged . . . there is nothing different about him today than there was 40 years ago.”  Suggs, 
2011 WL 2586413, at *7. 
2
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normality.”14  The State then moved to call Suggs as a witness to 
prove that he did in fact satisfy SOMTA‟s definition of such condi-
tion.15 
Suggs objected to being called as a witness for the State, ar-
guing that the State could not require him to testify against his will in 
an Article 10 proceeding.16  Whether the State may compel a respon-
dent to testify against his will during such a proceeding was an issue 
of first impression for the New York County Supreme Court.17  The 
New York County Supreme Court denied the State‟s motion to com-
pel the respondent to testify, holding that “absent the consent of a 
respondent, a respondent cannot be called as a witness by the State at 
an Article 10 trial and be compelled to testify against himself.”18  The 
court in Suggs began its determination by acknowledging that there 
were five relevant constitutional and statutory provisions linked to 
the issue before the court
19
: (1) the Fifth Amendment to the United 
States Constitution,
20
 (2) article I, section 6 of the New York Consti-
tution,
21
 (3) Civil Practice Rules and Law section 4512,
22
 (4) Civil 
Practice Rules and Law section 4501,
23
 and (5) Article 10 of the 
 
14 Suggs, 920 N.Y.S.2d at 645 (emphasis added).  “The age of Mr. Suggs . . . meant that 
he could not opine that Mr. Suggs was likely to re-offend if released, even if released with 
no supervision.”  Suggs, 2011 WL 2586413, at *10. 
15 Suggs, 920 N.Y.S.2d at 645.  “The State had earlier alerted the Court and the Respon-
dent that they might be moving to call the Respondent as a witness and the Court had pre-
viously heard legal arguments on the issue.”  Id. 
16 Id. 
17 Id. at 644. 
18 Id. at 654. 
19 Suggs, 920 N.Y.S.2d  at 645. 
20 U.S. CONST. amend. V. 
21 N.Y. CONST. art. I, § 6. 
22 N.Y. C.P.L.R. § 4512, entitled “Competency of interest witness or spouse” states, “Ex-
cept as otherwise expressly prescribed, a person shall not be excluded or excused from being 
a witness, by reason of his interest in the event or because he is a party or the spouse of a 
party.”  N.Y. C.P.L.R. § 4512 (McKinney 2012). 
23 N.Y. C.P.L.R. § 4501, entitled “Self-incrimination,” states: 
A competent witness shall not be excused from answering a relevant 
question, on the ground only that the answer may tend to establish that 
he owes a debt or is otherwise subject to a civil suit.  This section does 
not require a witness to give an answer which will tend to accuse himself 
of a crime or to expose him to a penalty or forfeiture, nor does it vary 
any other rule respecting the examination of a witness. 
N.Y. C.P.L.R. § 4501 (McKinney 2012). 
3
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Mental Hygiene Law.
24
 
The court in Suggs started its analysis of the Fifth Amend-
ment by referring to Allen v. Illinois,
25
 a United States Supreme Court 
decision which upheld the constitutionality of civil management and 
denied the defendant the right to assert his privilege against self-
incrimination.
26
  In Allen, the Supreme Court considered the issue of 
“whether proceedings under the Illinois „Sexually Dangerous Persons 
Act‟ [hereinafter “the Act”] were criminal within the meaning of the 
Fifth Amendment‟s guarantee against compulsory self-
incrimination.”27  The petitioner in Allen, Terry B. Allen, was 
charged with committing unlawful restraint and deviate sexual as-
sault.
28
  The state subsequently filed a petition to have Allen declared 
a sexually dangerous person.
29
 
At trial, the State presented testimony of two psychiatrists de-
spite Allen‟s objections that it violated his privilege against self-
incrimination.
30
  Both psychiatrists testified that the “petitioner was 
mentally ill and had criminal propensities to commit sexual as-
saults.”31  The trial court found the petitioner to be sexually danger-
 
24 Suggs, 920 N.Y.S.2d at 645.  See also Mental Hygiene Legal Service v. Spitzer, No. 07 
Civ. 2935(GEL), 2007 WL 4115936, at *1 (S.D.N.Y. 2007) (stating the history behind 
SOMTA). 
On March 14, 2007, Governor Spitzer signed the Sex Offender Man-
agement and Treatment Act, which became effective on April 13, 2007, 
in part as Article 10 of the New York Mental Hygiene Law (“MHL”), 
creating a new legal regime for “Sex Offenders Requiring Civil Com-
mitment or Supervision.”  As part of the Act, the New York Legislature 
found that “recidivistic sex offenders pose a danger to society that 
should be addressed through comprehensive programs of treatment and 
management,” . . . and that some “sex offenders have mental abnormali-
ties that predispose them to engage in repeated sex offenses” . . . . The 
Legislature concluded that such offenders „should receive . . . treatment 
while they are incarcerated as a result of the criminal process, and should 
continue to receive treatment when that incarceration comes to an end.  
In extreme cases, confinement of the most dangerous offenders will need 
to be extended by civil process in order to provide them such treatment 
and to protect the public from their recidivist conduct. 
Id. (citations omitted). 
25 478 U.S. 364 (1986). 
26 Id. at 375. 
27 Suggs, 920 N.Y.S.2d at 646. 
28 Allen, 478 U.S. at 365. 
29 Id. 
30 Id. at 366. 
31 Id. 
4
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ous under the Act.
32
  The Appellate Court of Illinois reversed, and 
held that “the trial court had improperly relied upon testimony ob-
tained in violation of petitioner‟s privilege against self-
incrimination.”33  The Supreme Court of Illinois reinstated the trial 
court‟s decision and found the petitioner to be a sexually dangerous 
person under the Act.
34
  The court held that “the privilege against 
self-incrimination was not available in sexually-dangerous-person 
proceedings because they are „essentially civil in nature,‟ the aim of 
the statute being to provide „treatment, not punishment.‟ ”35  The Su-
preme Court of the United States granted certiorari,
36
 and in a 5-4 de-
cision delivered by Justice Rehnquist, the Court concluded that “the 
Illinois proceedings . . . were not „criminal‟ within the meaning of the 
Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution, and that due 
process does not independently require application of the privilege 
[against self-incrimination].”37  In making its determination, the Su-
preme Court looked to the language of the Illinois statute.
38
  The 
Court found that a civil label is not always held to be dispositive.
39
  
The Court stated that “[w]here a defendant has provided „the clearest 
proof‟ that „the statutory scheme [is] so punitive either in purpose or 
effect as to negate [the State‟s] intention‟ that the proceeding be civil, 
it must be considered criminal and the privilege against self-
incrimination must be applied.”40  The Court ultimately concluded 
that the statutory scheme was civil in nature, not criminal, because it 
did not have such a punitive effect.
41
 
Justice Stevens, joined by Justices Brennan, Marshall, and 
Blackmun, dissented, stating that a procedure must be labeled a 
“criminal case” under the Fifth Amendment in situations where the 
“criminal law casts so long a shadow on a putatively civil proceed-
 
32 Id. 
33 Allen, 478 U.S at 367 (citation omitted). 
34 Id. 
35 Id. (citation omitted). 
36 Id. at 368. 
37 Id. at 375. 
38 See Allen, 478 U.S at 368 (noting that the question of “whether a particular proceeding 
is criminal for the purposes of the Self-Incrimination Clause is first of all a question of statu-
tory construction” (citations omitted)). 
39 Id. at 369. 
40 Id. (quoting United States v. Ward, 448 U.S. 242, 248-49 (1980)). 
41 Id. at 375. 
5
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ing.”42  Justice Stevens reasoned that: 
The impact of an adverse judgment against an individ-
ual deemed to be a “sexually dangerous person” is at 
least as serious as a guilty verdict in a typical criminal 
trial . . . . [T]he sexually-dangerous-person proceeding 
authorizes far longer imprisonment than a mere find-
ing of guilt on an analogous criminal charge.
43
 
The dissent disagreed with the majority‟s justification that 
persons found to be sexually dangerous are a threat to society.
44
  The 
dissent argued that this finding does not suffice as a justification for 
denying an individual the Fifth Amendment privilege against self-
incrimination, for the right would be unavailable to anyone who is 
accused of committing a violent crime.
45  
Moreover, the dissent also 
noted that even though the State may undergo greater difficulty in 
finding evidence that will lead to imprisonment—absent a defen-
dant‟s testimony—this difficulty also does not justify the denial of 
one‟s privilege against self-incrimination.46  Otherwise, the right 
against self-incrimination “would never be justified, for it could al-
ways be said to have that effect.”47  Justice Stevens strongly disa-
greed with the majority, as well as with the Supreme Court of Illi-
nois; he consequently would have affirmed the decision of the 
Appellate Court of Illinois, which held that Allen‟s privilege against 
self-incrimination was, in fact, violated.
48
 
Although the majority in Allen consisted of only five justic-
es,
49
 it has since been the leading authority for the United States Su-
preme Court.
50
  Clear support does not exist for the proposition that a 
respondent can refuse to answer questions in an Article 10 proceed-
ing under the Fifth Amendment‟s privilege against self-
 
42 Id. at 376 (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
43 Allen, 478 U.S at 377.  See also United States ex rel. Stachulak v. Coughlin, 520 F.2d 
931 (7th Cir. 1975) (recognizing that a proceeding under the Sexually Dangerous Person‟s 
Act can lead to far longer imprisonment, an indeterminate commitment, than a guilty charge 
in a criminal trial). 
44 Allen, 478 U.S. at 382 (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
45 Id. 
46 Id. 
47 Id. 
48 People v. Allen, 463 N.E.2d 135 (Ill. App. Ct. 1984), rev’d, Allen, 478 U.S. 364. 
49 Allen, 478 U.S. at 365. 
50 Suggs, 920 N.Y.S.2d at 647-48. 
6
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incrimination.
51
  For instance, in Kansas v. Hendricks,
52
 the United 
States Supreme Court held that persons found to have a “Mental Ab-
normality” are to be committed under civil management and are not 
entitled to the protection of the Fifth Amendment.
53
  In Hendricks, 
Kansas enacted the Sexually Violent Predator Act which set-forth 
procedures for the civil commitment of all individuals who were 
found to have a “mental abnormality” or a personality disorder, and 
who were considered “likely to engage in „predatory acts of sexual 
violence.‟ ”54  The defendant in this case, Leroy Hendricks, was an 
inmate with a long history of sexually molesting children.
55
  Hen-
dricks admitted that he abused children whenever he was not impri-
soned.
56
  He further stated that the only way to be sure that he would 
not sexually abuse another child was if he were to die.
57
  Hendricks 
was subsequently found to be a sexually violent predator under the 
statute.
58
  Hendricks appealed this finding, arguing that the Sexually 
Violent Predator Act established a criminal proceeding, and he was 
therefore entitled to his constitutional privilege against self-
incrimination.
59
 
In upholding civil management in Hendricks, the Supreme 
Court underwent the same analysis as it did in Allen, and similarly 
found: 
[C]ommitment under the Act does not implicate either 
 
51 Id. at 648. 
52 521 U.S. 346 (1997). 
53 Id. at 369. 
54 Id. at 350 (citation omitted). 
55 Id.  Hendricks‟ sexually violent history consisted of the following: In 1955, Hendricks 
exposed his genitals to two young girls and pleaded guilty to indecent exposure.  Id. at 354.  
In 1957, he was convicted of lewdness involving a young girl and received a brief jail sen-
tence.  Hendricks, 521 U.S at 354.  In 1960, he molested two young boys while he worked 
for a carnival and served two years in prison.  Id.  On parole, he molested a 7 year-old girl 
and was rearrested.  Id.  In 1965, he was released from a state psychiatric hospital where at-
tempts had been made to treat his sexual deviance.  Id.  In 1967, Hendricks assaulted another 
young boy and girl.  Id.  He performed oral sex on the 8-year old girl and fondled the 11 
year-old boy.  Hendricks, 521 U.S at 354.  He refused to participate in a sex offender treat-
ment program, and therefore remained incarcerated until his parole in 1972.  Id.  “In 1984, 
Hendricks was convicted of taking „indecent liberties‟ with two 13-year-old boys.”  Id. at 
353. 
56 Id. at 355. 
57 Id. 
58 Hendricks, 521 U.S. at 355. 
59 Id. at 361. 
7
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of the two primary objectives of criminal punishment: 
retribution or deterrence.  The Act‟s purpose is not re-
tributive because it does not affix culpability for prior 
criminal conduct.  Instead, such conduct is used solely 
for evidentiary purposes, either to demonstrate that a 
„mental abnormality‟ exists or to support a finding of 
future dangerousness.
60
 
The Court did not find commitment under Kansas‟ Sexually 
Violent Predator Act to be of a punitive nature.
61
  On the contrary, 
the Court found that it was far from punitive, and that the confine-
ment‟s duration was directly linked to the need to protect society.62  
Thus, a person‟s confinement would continue until the individual‟s 
“mental abnormality” is no longer considered to be a threat to the 
community.
63
  The Supreme Court ultimately held that involuntary 
confinement under the Sexually Violent Predator Act did not estab-
lish a criminal proceeding.
64
 
Adhering to federal precedent, New York courts have relied 
on Allen and its progeny in cases presenting similar issues.  For ex-
ample, in State v. Nelson,
65
 the New York County Supreme Court 
“analyzed the question of whether the retroactive designation of cer-
tain non-sex crimes as „sexually-motivated‟ felonies eligible for cov-
erage under SOMTA violated the ex post facto clause of the United 
States Constitution.”66  The respondent, Nelson, was convicted for 
kidnapping, promoting prostitution, and bail jumping.
67
  A sex of-
fender civil management petition was filed against Nelson.
68
  Nelson 
moved to dismiss the petition, arguing that it violated the United 
States and New York State Constitutions.
69
  In accordance with the 
reasoning of the majority opinion in Allen, the New York County Su-
preme Court held that “SOMTA‟s retroactive designation of certain 
 
60 Id. at 361-62. 
61 Id. at 363. 
62 Id. 
63 Hendricks, 521 U.S. at 363 (citation omitted). 
64 Id. at 369. 
65 No. 20459, 2010 WL 4628018 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. Nov. 16, 2010). 
66 Suggs, 920 N.Y.S.2d at 647. 
67 Nelson, 2010 WL 4628018, at *1. 
68 Id. 
69 Id. at *1. 
8
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prior criminal convictions as sexually motivated was a civil proce-
dure.”70 
Many other New York courts have also relied on Allen, and 
have held that statutes similar to SOMTA fall under civil proceed-
ings, and therefore the privilege against self-incrimination is inap-
plicable.
71
  In State v. C.B.,
72
 the Bronx County Supreme Court dealt 
with the same issue as the court in Suggs, and held that the Fifth 
Amendment right against self-incrimination does not apply in pro-
ceedings pursuant to Article 10.
73
  In C.B., respondent C.B. made a 
videotaped confession.
74
  On the tape, C.B. described eleven separate 
events in which he masturbated on sleeping females while unlawfully 
entering private residences, and further admitted to being an exhibi-
tionist.
75
  C.B. also stated that he needed help to deal with an alleged 
disease that was to blame for his repeatedly committing such 
crimes.
76
 
C.B. challenged the admission of these tapes, arguing that it 
would violate his “constitutional right to challenge the voluntariness 
of the confession, since none of the procedural avenues to challenge 
that admission of the videotape which are available in a criminal pro-
ceeding apply under Article 10.”77  The court decided that the video-
taped statements made by C.B. were relevant and necessary for the 
jury to make a determination as to C.B.‟s present mental condition.78  
 
70 Suggs, 920 N.Y.S.2d at 647. 
71 Id. at 647.  See, e.g., Hendricks, 521 U.S. 346 (noting that the legislature found it neces-
sary to establish a civil commitment procedure for the long-term care and treatment of the 
sexually violent predator); Nelson, 2010 WL 4628018, at *9 (finding that retroactive sexual-
ly motivated felonies were not punitive.  Id.  “[T]he mere fact that a person is detained does 
not inexorably lead to the conclusion that the government has imposed punishment.”) (cita-
tions omitted); In re Michael WW., 798 N.Y.S.2d 222, 223 (App. Div. 4th Dep‟t 2005) 
(finding that whether or not respondent voluntarily waived his Miranda rights was “irrele-
vant to a Family Court Article 10 proceeding because they are grounded in the rights to re-
main silent and to counsel under the Fifth and Sixth Amendments, which only apply in the 
context of criminal proceedings”); and Ughetto v. Acrish, 518 N.Y.S.2d 398, 403 (App. Div. 
2d Dep‟t 1981) (adopting the reasoning in Allen and finding that “involuntary commitment 
proceedings under the Mental Hygiene Law are civil and not criminal in nature”). 
72 No. 51010(U), 2009 WL 1460779 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. May 20, 2009). 
73 Suggs, 920 N.Y.S.2d at 647 (quoting C.B., 2009 WL 1460779, at *3). 
74 C.B., 2009 WL 1460779, at *1. 
75 Id. 
76 Id. 
77 Id. 
78 Id. at *3. 
9
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The court conclusively held that “[n]o Fifth Amendment right applies 
in this civil, sex offender commitment proceeding.”79 
While courts have consistently held that the constitutional 
right against self-incrimination does not apply in civil management 
cases, the court in Suggs acknowledged that New York has afforded 
greater rights under the New York Constitution than those of the 
United States Constitution.
80
  The New York Court of Appeals has 
provided greater protection despite the fact that article I, section 6 of 
the New York State Constitution contains the same substantive lan-
guage as that of the Fifth Amendment.
81
  In determining “whether the 
state constitution provides broader protections than a federal constitu-
tional provision with identical language . . . New York courts engage 
in an analysis known as „noninterpretive review.‟ ”82  Such an analy-
sis can be seen in the case In re Nassau County Grand Jury Subpoena 
Duces Tecum Dated June 24, 2003 [hereinafter Duces Tecum],
83
 
where the New York Court of Appeals was confronted with the issue 
of “whether the New York privilege against compelled self-
incrimination . . . afford[s] greater protection regarding fundamental 
rights than the Federal Constitution and the United States Supreme 
Court.”84 
The court in Duces Tecum established a “two-pronged „inter-
pretive‟ and „nointerpretive‟ analysis of various factors to determine 
if a provision of [a] State Constitution should be construed more 
broadly than its federal analog.”85  This analysis consists of “first re-
view[ing] the text of the state and federal constitutional provisions[,] 
„[i]f the language of the State Constitution differs from that of its 
Federal counterpart, then the court may conclude that there is a basis 
for a different interpretation of it.‟ ”86  When there is not a “material 
 
79 C.B., 2009 WL 1460779, at *3 (citations omitted). 
80 Suggs, 920 N.Y.S.2d at 648 (citations omitted). 
81 Id.  See, e.g., People v. Davis, 553 N.E.2d 1008, 1010-11 (N.Y. 1990) (holding that 
New York‟s right to counsel “extends well beyond the right to counsel afforded by the Sixth 
Amendment of the United States Constitution and other State Constitutions”); see also 
People v. Bethea, 493 N.E.2d 937, 938 (N.Y. 1986) (reading a constitutional rule practicable 
even if it were if it were deemed inconsistent with federal constitutional rule). 
82 Suggs, 920 N.Y.S.2d at 648. 
83 830 N.E.2d 1118 (N.Y. 2005). 
84 Id. at 1123. 
85 Id. 
86 Id. (citation omitted). 
10
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textual difference between the relevant constitutional provisions,” the 
court must only “conduct a „noninterpretive‟ review of the constitu-
tional provisions.”87  The court noted that a noninterpretive review 
seeks to discover: 
[A]ny preexisting State statutory or common law de-
fining the scope of the individual right in question; the 
history and traditions of the State in its protection of 
that individual right; any identification of the right in 
the State Constitution as being one of peculiar State or 
local concern; and any distinctive attitudes of the State 
citizenry toward the definition, scope or protection of 
the individual right.
88
 
Such a finding leads to the conclusion that a broader reading of the 
state constitutional provision is applicable.
89
  However, after conduct-
ing this noninterpretive analysis, the New York Court of Appeals in 
Duces Tecum concluded that “none of the factors that would suggest 
a broader reading of article I, section 6 were present.”90 
A noninterpretive review analysis may help support a broad 
reading of Suggs‟ SOMTA.  However, there is yet to be a case 
“where such an analysis has been conducted with respect to whether 
respondents in proceedings which bear some resemblance to Article 
10 have a right against self-incrimination which is broader than that 
provided by the federal constitution.”91  Thus, no support exists for a 
broader reading of the New York Constitution.
92
 
The court in Suggs did not have clear support for the proposi-
tion that a respondent in an Article 10 trial may refuse to answer 
questions by asserting his Fifth Amendment privilege against self-
incrimination.
93
  The United States Supreme Court has consistently 
followed the reasoning found in the seminal case Allen and its proge-
ny, concluding that Article 10 proceedings are civil in nature.  Simi-
larly, there is also a lack of support for the proposition that article I, 
section 6 of the New York State Constitution provides a more expan-
 
87 Id. 
88 Duces Tecum, 830 N.E.2d at 1123-24 (citation omitted). 
89 Id. at 1124. 
90 Id. 
91 Suggs, 920 N.Y.S.2d at 648. 
92 Id. 
93 Id. 
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sive right than the Fifth Amendment, for the New York courts have 
yet to undergo a noninterpretive review analysis which would support 
a broader interpretation of the statute found in Suggs.
94
  The New 
York County Supreme Court then questioned whether either New 
York‟s Civil Practice Rules and Law section 4501 entitled, “Self In-
crimination,” or section 4512, entitled, “Competency of Witness or 
Spouse,” was applicable to Article 10.95 
The court in Suggs again was unable to find clear authority 
for a respondent‟s right to refuse to answer questions in an Article 10 
proceeding under Civil Practice Rules and Law section 4501.
96
  Civil 
Practice Rules and Law section 4501 provides that an individual is 
not to be excused from answering relevant questions in civil cases, or 
in cases which tend to prove that the individual owes a debt.
97
  How-
ever, it goes on to state that one would not be required “to give an an-
swer which will tend to accuse himself of a crime or to expose him to 
a penalty or forfeiture . . . .”98  The court noted that “[t]he scope of 
this protection is unclear, . . .” for caselaw provides little guidance.99  
While New York courts have provided this privilege to respondents 
in Article 81 guardianship proceedings, the Fourth Department “re-
cently held that the Fifth Amendment‟s right against compulsory self-
incrimination did not apply to Article 81 guardianship proceedings 
and that a respondent subject to an Article 81 petition can be com-
pelled to testify at a hearing against his will.”100  The disparity be-
tween federal precedent and state caselaw does not provide support 
for allowing a respondent‟s refusal to answer questions under Civil 
Practice Rules and Law section 4501.
101
  Additionally, the court 
found that Article 10 explicitly includes Civil Practice Rules and Law 
section 4512, which “supports the notion that respondents may be 
called as witnesses by the State at a SOMTA trial.”102  Instead the 
court found that section 10.07(c) of New York‟s Mental Hygiene 
Law “explicitly provides that the statute shall be governed by the 
 
94 Id. 
95 Id. at 648-50. 
96 Suggs, 920 N.Y.S.2d at 650. 
97 N.Y. C.P.L.R. § 4501 (McKinney 2012). 
98 Id. 
99 Suggs, 920 N.Y.S.2d at 649. 
100 Id. at 649-50 (citation omitted). 
101 Id. at 650. 
102 Id. (emphasis added). 
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provisions of Article 45 of the CPLR.”103  Thus, Article 10 specifical-
ly includes the CPLR provision, which “allows one party to call an 
opposing party as a witness,” which helps support the proposition 
that the State is allowed to call respondents to testify in SOMTA pro-
ceedings.
104
 
The New York County Supreme Court then underwent an 
analysis of whether the language of Article 10 of the Mental Hygiene 
Law itself allowed the State to call a respondent as a witness over the 
respondent‟s objection.105  The court noted that this issue was com-
plex.
106
  The court stated that “the treatment of the issue in contexts 
analogous to SOMTA has been a close question.”107  The court found 
that numerous provisions of Article 10 indicate that the Legislature 
did not intend to allow for the State to call a respondent as a witness 
over the respondent‟s objection.108  The court noted that, “[f]irst, Ar-
ticle 10 directly addresses the question of who may call the respon-
dent as a witness at an Article 10 trial.”109  However,  “[t]he statute 
does not contain any provision . . . which authorizes the State to call a 
respondent as a witness at his own trial [which] . . . creates a strong 
inference that the Legislature did not intend the State to have that 
right.”110 
Second, the court interpreted section 10.06(d) of the Mental 
Hygiene Law to be a strong inference of the fact that the “Legislature 
intended the decision on whether to testify at an Article 10 trial to 
rest with respondents alone.”111  This section provides the Attorney 
General with the power to “request that a respondent be subject to a 
psychiatric examination . . . upon such a request the Court must order 
such an examination.”112  However, the statute does not provide any 
sanction or punishment for a respondent who “refuses to submit to 
 
103 Id. 
104 Suggs, 920 N.Y.S.2d at 650 (emphasis added). 
105 Id. at 651-52. 
106 Id. at 651. 
107 Id. 
108 Id. 
109 Suggs, 920 N.Y.S.2d at 651.  The statute provides, “The respondent may, as a matter of 
right, testify in his or her own behalf, call and examine other witnesses, and produce other 
evidence in his or her behalf.”  Id. (citation omitted). 
110 Id. 
111 Id. 
112 Id. (citation omitted). 
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such an examination.”113  The statute‟s only remedy available against 
a respondent who refuses examination is that the State is entitled to 
an instruction to the jury that such respondent refused examination.
114
 
The court in Suggs ultimately concluded that “the most rea-
sonable inference which can be drawn from the provisions of Article 
10 is that the Legislature implicitly assumes that the well-established 
right of a criminal defendant to refuse to be called by the prosecution 
would apply in Article 10 trials.”115  Thus, a respondent cannot be 
compelled to testify against himself.
116
 
Rather than deferring to the discretion of the United States 
Supreme Court or New York State decisional law, the court in Suggs 
blatantly defies both federal precedent and State law.  The court re-
lied on the language of Article 10, and inferred that the Legislature 
intended for Article 10 to provide protections not afforded by either 
the Federal Constitution, or the New York State Constitution.  This 
holding is likely to create a significant amount of controversy. 
Although Suggs‟ holding at first glance appears to have a 
compelling social policy justification—not allowing a respondent to 
incriminate him or herself in a case where he or she can be greatly 
impacted by an adverse judgment
117—this holding will most likely 
lead to serious complications.  For instance, by allowing individuals 
the right to assert their Fifth Amendment right against self-
incrimination in cases where the defendant is a repeat offender, the 
State may be presented with fact-finding issues.  The court will con-
sequently be presented with great difficulty in proving that the res-
pondent in fact suffers from a mental abnormality under SOMTA or 
similar statutes.  Proponents of the holding may offer the argument 
that the jury may still find a respondent to suffer from a mental ab-
normality, despite the individual not being compelled to testify.
118
  
However, testimony such as that of Respondent Hendricks in Hen-
dricks would be foreclosed from trial, and evidence may be insuffi-
 
113 Suggs, 920 N.Y.S.2d at 651. 
114 Id. at 651-52. 
115 Id. at 653. 
116 Id. at 654. 
117 See Allen, 478 U.S. at 377 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (arguing that the finding of an indi-
vidual to be a sexually dangerous person “authorizes far longer imprisonment than a mere 
finding of guilt on an analogous criminal charge”). 
118 See Suggs, No. 30051-09, 2011 WL 2586413, at *25 (finding Respondent Suggs to be 
a “Dangerous Sex Offender in Need of Confinement”). 
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cient to ensure a correct holding. 
Furthermore, Suggs holding creates tension with the court‟s 
holding in C.B.  For instance, if New York courts were to follow the 
court‟s decision in Suggs, courts would hold a respondent‟s video-
taped confession to be privileged, and would therefore hold it to be 
inadmissible evidence to prove the individual suffers from a mental 
abnormality.  The court‟s decision in Suggs may consequently lead to 
the release of potentially dangerous persons into society who will 
continue to commit crimes against others.
119
 
Proponents of the Suggs decision may further argue that 
Suggs‟ holding provides a safeguard for individuals whose liberty is 
threatened by civil management.  By refusing to be a witness against 
oneself, an individual is protected from the severe results of an ad-
verse judgment.  A finding that one suffers from a Mental Abnor-
mality leads to indefinite confinement or long term treatment.  How-
ever, as the majority in Allen reasoned, civil management 
proceedings are designed to provide care and treatment for persons 
who are found to pose a threat to the community.  These individuals 
will be released from such facilities as soon as he or she is no longer 
seen to be dangerous to others.
120
  Statues such as those in Allen or 
Suggs, allow for the overall protection of one‟s community.  Suggs‟ 
holding conversely leads to the protection of a person who puts the 
lives of the others in direct danger, rather than providing treatment 
for such an individual before releasing him or her into society.  This 
court should defer to the judgment of the Supreme Court, rather than 
creating such controversy and potential danger. 
 
Lina R. Carbuccia
*
 
 
 
119 See Hendricks, 521 U.S. 353.  Respondent Hendricks admitted that he had repeatedly 
abused children whenever he was not confined, and also stated that “the only way he could 
keep from sexually abusing children in the future was „to die.‟ ”  Id. at 355. 
120 See Allen, 478 U.S. at 370 (reasoning that the State has an obligation to provide care 
and treatment for the recovery of persons found to be sexually dangerous under the statute). 
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